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In this paper I consider the e¤ects of migration on the spread and the speed
of the propagation of new conventions, technologies, etc. I show that the
speed of the propagation increases with the openness of the economy. The
application of the model to the equilibrium selection in 2 £ 2 coordination
games is also discussed.1 INTRODUCTION
New ideas, norms, and conventions are born at a speci…c time and at a
speci…c location, and only gradually they take hold at the place of their birth
and spread over the larger areas. How, exactly, do they evolve and spread?
By now there exists a considerable literature on the evolution of social be-
havior. Foster and Young (1990), Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (KMR) (1993),
and Young (1993) use evolutionary models with a persistent randomness to
study the long-run behavior in games. They got some strong results on the
equilibrium selection. The evolution, however, took place only in time and
the spatial dimension was completely ignored.
The papers that introduce some spatial relationship between the play-
ers are Anderlini and Ianni (1996), Blume (1993, 1995), Ellison (1993), Ely
(1995), Young (1999). These papers assume that the players are connected
by some network, and that the behavior adopted by an individual depends
on its intrinsic payo¤ and the behavior of her neighbors. The general con-
clusion of this literature is that the speed of evolution is facilitated by the
local nature of the interactions. However, the spatial dimension is modeled
in a too stylized fashion, which does not allow us to study the spread of
the behavior in the real space. To illustrate the point, suppose you have
1a farming community where the neighbors live miles away from each other.
Would a new technology originated at one of the farms have traveled faster
had they lived next to each other? To give a more modern example, would
the globalization, lowering the migration costs, result in a faster di¤usion of
conventions and customs? How exactly is the speed of di¤usion linked to the
openness of the global economy? To answer these types of questions, one has
to have a model where the evolution takes place in the real physical space
rather then in a network.
In this paper I suggest such a model. I consider the evolution of the social
behavior when the individuals are able to migrate. The motivation for this
is twofold. First, I feel that the migration is an important phenomenon that
takes place in the real world. Second, the model will allow me to address
some interesting questions, which cannot be even formulated in the previous
literature.
A basic model is rather simple. Assume that each member of the pop-
ulation possesses a certain behavioral trait. The trait can be interpreted as
a strategy in some game, a determinant of the preferences (a certain “gene”
may force you to reciprocate, to have a child out of wedlock, to go to the
college, or to commit a certain kind of a crime), or a belief. In the case when
2a trait is interpreted as a determinant of the preferences, one has to distin-
guish between the utility payo¤ and the …tness payo¤. The distinction is well
known in the literature on the evolution of preferences. (e. g. Bergstrom
1995, Robson 1996). If a trait is a strategy in a 2 £ 2 coordination game, I
will refer to it as a convention. The fraction of the people at a particular lo-
cation that posses a certain trait is assumed to change due to the di¤erential
replication and the migration.
The di¤erential replication is described by the replicator dynamics. For
a discussion of the replicator dynamics see, for example, Samuelson (1997).
Corradi and Sarin (2000), Schlag (1998), and Samuelson (1997) proposed
several behavioral models that give rise to the replicator dynamics. I sketch
a slightly modi…ed version of Samuelson’s Aspiration and Imitation model in
the Appendix 1 to this paper.
The second force that changes the share of the population possessing a
certain trait is the migration. The ‡ow of the migrants is assumed to have
two components, a strategic component, related to the payo¤s di¤erentials
at di¤erent locations, and a random component. Intuitively, a particular
trait determines the payo¤s an individual gets only in some of her relations.
The decision to migrate, on the other hand, is assumed to be a¤ected by the
3total payo¤ the individual can get at the location, which is the sum of the
payo¤s over all the relations. If a trait is important for almost all kinds of
the relations (e. g. ability), then the decision to migrate will be strategic
with respect to this trait. However, if a trait a¤ects only a small fraction
of the relations (e. g. reciprocity) then its contribution to the total utility
earned at the particular location is negligible and the migration decision is
approximately uncorrelated with this trait.
If a trait is interpreted as a strategy in some game, in the long-run the
model described in this paper can be viewed as a model of equilibrium se-
lection. I will show that in 2 £ 2 coordination games it selects the risk-
dominant equilibrium, which is similar to the result obtained by Foster and
Young (1990), KMR (1993), and Young (1993). It should be stressed that
the mathematics of the equilibrium selection in this model is similar to those
of Foster and Young. This implies that the selection of the risk-dominant
equilibrium depends crucially on the properties of the replicator dynamics
and does not generalize to the arbitrary payo¤ monotone dynamics, which
would be the case in the KMR framework.
The model can also be applied to study a speed of the adoption of a
new technology. There is a considerable evidence to demonstrate that the
4di¤usion of new technologies is a spatial variable. See for example, Thwaites
(1982) and Rees, Briggs, Oakey (1984). This conclusion is consistent with my
model. Another explanation was suggested by Baptista (2000), who argues
that externalities promoting the adoption of new technologies are stronger
on the regional level.
The model developed in this paper allows us to go beyond making the
long-run predictions. It provides a description of the dynamics of a conven-
tion. It can be used to demonstrate that though in the one-dimensional world
the local conventions can spread, this is not the case in the two-dimensional
world. In order to spread, a convention should initially arise at some non-
trivial area.
The model also allows us to study the speed of the propagation of new
traits. I show that the traits that a¤ect the payo¤s in many relations spread
faster then those that a¤ect few, provided that the rate of di¤erential repro-
duction is su¢ciently sensitive to the payo¤ di¤erences. I also show that the
speed of the propagation of a trait depends on the degree of the openness of
the economy. The form of this dependence does not depend on the functional
form of the payo¤s. This conclusion is of the particular importance in the
view of the globalization of the world economy.
5Another interesting conclusion is thatinthe absence ofspatial dependence
of the payo¤s all the world will eventually adopt the same customs and
conventions. Hence, to explain the di¤erences in the national cultures one
has to assume that the payo¤s to a particular trait di¤er with the location
due, for example, to the di¤erence in physical conditions. Just modelling
the social interactions as a game with multiple equilibria is not enough to
explain the di¤erences in the long-run behavior across di¤erent locations.
The dependence of the social conventions on the physical conditions was
always appreciated by the historians. Trevelyan (1937), for example, begins
his volume of the English history from the description of the geography of
the island.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 I introduce a general model
of evolution with migration and analyze the properties of the solution. In
Section 3 I give some examples. In Section 4 I compare the results of this
paper with the results in the literature and discuss some possible extensions.
The paper has two Appendices. Appendix 1 contains a review of a version
of the Samuelson’s Aspiration and Imitation model in the case when the
population is hyper…nite. Appendix 2 brie‡y discusses the construction of
the hyperreal numbers from the reals.
62 THE MODEL
In this section I formulate the master equation of my model and study
some of its properties. For simplicity, I will concentrate on the case when the
trait can take only two values 0 and 1: a strategy in a 2£2 symmetric game,
an attitude towards reciprocity (an individual may either return favors or not
return them), or an ability in a signalling game. The generalization of the
model for the traits that can take more than two values is straightforward.
Let u(x;t) be the fraction of the individuals who are located at location x
at time t and posses trait 0. I will assume that x 2 - ½ Rm, where - is
compact and one-connected. In applications I will put m = 1;2, but I will
develop the theory for the general case (perhaps, in the anticipation of the
space travel). Let ¼i(u;x) be the payo¤ to trait i, which may depend on the
fraction of the individuals, possessing the trait and on the location. In the
absence of migration the evolution of u is assumed to be governed by
@u
@t
= u(1 ¡ u)(¼0(u;x) ¡ ¼1(u;x)): (1)
Equation (1) states that the rate of change of the fraction of the individuals
possessing a certain trait is proportional to the di¤erence between the payo¤
7they earn and the payo¤ earned by the individuals possessing an alternative
trait.1
To introduce migration consider a compact set V ½ - with a smooth
boundary §. The change of the measure of the individuals possessing a
certain trait and located within V occurs due to the di¤erential replication
and the migration. Therefore, assuming that the rate of the di¤erential












Vector m is the net migration ‡ow through § of the individuals possessing
trait 0. Let
Á(u;x) = ¼0(u;x) ¡ ¼1(u;x)
In the absence of the strategic motive the net out‡ow of the migrants from a
particular location will be proportional to the size of the population at this
location. For example, even assuming the economic conditions are the same
1Appendix to this paper derives the replicator dynamics from a behavioral model in
the context of a 2 £ 2 coordination game.
8all over the globe, it is likely that the would be more emigrants from China
than immigrants into China. Hence, the migration will tend to equalize the
fraction of the individuals possessing a certain trait across the locations, i.
e. the migration ‡ow will be proportional to the gradient of u(¢). In general,
I will assume that
m = °(®ru + (1 ¡ ®)(Áuru + rxÁ)). (3)
Coe¢cient ® 2 [0;1] measures a random component of the migration ‡ow. If
® = 0 the decision to migrate is purely strategic, while if ® = 1 it is totally
random. Coe¢cient ° ¸ 0 measures the openness of the economy. Small
values of ° correspond to a closed economy with strict restrictions on the
migration.
Expression (3) can be derived from a behavioral model similar to that pre-
sented in Appendix 1. One has to assume that the individuals are located in
the vertices of a lattice with an in…nitesimal2 side h and that the probability
to move from a vertex of the lattice to a neighboring one in an (in…nitesimal)
unit of time is proportional to this unit of time and non-decreasing in the
2see the Appendix 2 and Albervito, Fenstand, Høegh-Krohn, Lindstrøm (1986) for a
discussion of the in…nitesimal numbers and other notions of the nonstandard analysis.
9payo¤ di¤erence between the vertexes.
Using the divergence theorem transform the second term on the right











= f(u;x) + °div(®ru + (1 ¡ ®)(Áuru + rxÁ)); (5)
where f(u;x) = u(1 ¡ u)Á(u;x).
Now let us return to the discussion of (3). To understand the idea of
the strategic versus nonstrategic migration assume that at each moment of
time and at each location an individual can be called upon to participate
in one of K games. Both, the game and the partner are chosen at random.
With slight abuse of notation denote K = f1;:::;Kg. Let ¼k(x;t;¿) be the
expected payo¤ from participating in game k at location x at time t and
possessing trait ¿. For a …xed (x;t;¿) it can be viewed as a random variable







It is plausible to assume that the decision to migrate is determined by
¦(x;t;¿). Let
A(¿;K) = fk 2 K : ¼k(x;t;¿) depends on ¿g;






(trait ¿ a¤ects payo¤s payo¤s in a small fraction of games/relations), then
asymptotically ¦(x;t;¿) does not depend on ¿. Hence, the decision to mi-
grate is not strategic in ¿. In particular, the probability of the migration
should be independent of the payo¤ di¤erentials in a particular game af-
fected by ¿. In this case ® = 0 in expression (3). Otherwise, the decision to
migrate has a strategic motive and ® 2 (0;1].
The learning process is, however, game speci…c. It may take, for example,
11the form speci…ed in Appendix 1. In this case, the change of the share of











[h®ru + (1 ¡ ®)(Áuru + rxÁ);rui ¡ V (u;x)]dx; (6)
where h¢;¢i denotes the inner product of two vectors. I will begin the analysis
of dynamics (5) proving the following theorem:











where ±F=±u is the variational derivative of F. Now, using the chain rule

















2dt · 0: (9)
Let f(u;x) does not depend on x. Then the immediate Corollary of
Theorem 1 is:
Corollary 2 Let u¤ be a strict local maximum of V (¢). Then a stationary
uniform solution of (5) u(x;t) = u¤ is locally asymtotically stable.
Proof. De…ne Lyapunov function for (5) by
L(t) = F(u(t)): (10)
Then the result follows from Theorem 1.
13Function V (¢) can be interpreted as a potential of the system. I will call
the local maxima of V (u) the long-run outcomes. Apparently, a long-run
outcome is history dependent.
Assume that once in awhile some non-trivial fraction of the population
mutates. The question is, which of the local maxima of V (u) will be stable
under such a mutation. It turns out that only the global maxima have this
property. I will call them the very long-run outcomes.
I will not prove the claim made in the previous paragraph in the full
generality (for a proof see Bugaenko et. al., 1993). Instead I will consider
in detail a special case, which is of a particular importance in the economic
applications.
Assume, Á(u;x) does not depend on xand has a form
Á(u) = ¯(u ¡ u¤); (11)
where u¤ 2 (0;1). This assumption is satis…ed, for example, if the trait is
a strategy in a 2 £ 2 symmetric game. For ¯ < 0 there exists a unique
stationary solution u = u¤ 2 (0;1) and the population in the equilibrium will
be heteromorphic. For ¯ > 0 the function V (¢) achieves its local maxima for
14the monomorphic populations (u = 0 or u = 1). If the trait is a strategy in
a 2 £ 2 symmetric game, the …rst case will be realized for a zero-sum game
(u¤ will correspond to the equilibrium probability of strategy 0), while the
second will be realized for a coordination game (u¤ will correspond to the
equilibrium probability of strategy 0 in the mixed-strategy equilibrium).
Let us consider the case ¯ > 0. Though both monomorphic states are
locally stable, su¢ciently big exogenous disturbance (e. g. an invasion of the
individuals possessing a di¤erent trait) can take the system away from one
steady state into another. The switching does not occur simultaneously at all
locations, but rather travels along the system in a form of a switching wave.
Our next goal is to calculate the speed of the propagation of the switching
wave.
De…ne the total migration coe¢cient by
D = °(® + (1 ¡ ®)¯): (12)
Then equation (5) takes the form
@u
@t









Let us …rst consider the case m = 1. The switching wave from the state u = 1
into the state u = 0 moving with the speed c is the solution of equation (13)
of the form
u = u(x ¡ ct) (15)
satisfying the boundary conditions
lim
y!1u(y) = 0, lim
y!¡1u(y) = 1; (16)
where y = x ¡ ct. Plugging (15) into (13) one obtains
Du
00 = ¡f(u) ¡ cu
0: (17)
Multiplying both sides of (17) by u0, integrating from ¡1 to 1, and taking









(1 ¡ 2u¤): (18)
There exists a unique value of c, such that (18) is satis…ed. After performing





¯D(1 ¡ 2u¤): (19)
One can verify by a direct calculation that c > 0 if and only if V (0) >
V (1), hence in the long run the system will adopt a convention with a higher
value of V . This conclusion is general and does not depend on a speci…c
functional form of f which is chosen.
A steady state, which delivers the global maximum to V is called stable,
while the local maxima are called metastable. In the very long-run the system
will move away from a metastable to the stable steady state. If V (1) = V (0)
then c = 0 and both steady states can coexist in the very long-run. At the
point of switching u will change with a jump.
Several properties of (19) are worth noting. First, note that if ® = 0
17then c is proportional to ¯, while c is proportional to
p
¯ for ® = 1. This
means that if the migration is strategic the speed of the switching wave is
more sensitive to a payo¤ di¤erential then when migration is random. The
above result also suggests that if the rate of the di¤erential reproduction is
su¢ciently sensitive to the payo¤ di¤erentials (¯ > 1) the conventions which
a¤ect more relations spread more rapidly then the ones which a¤ect fewer
relations.
Second, note that the speed of the switching wave is increasing in the
degree of openness of the economy and is proportional to the square root of
the openness. This conclusion does not depend on the functional form of Á(¢)
and can be obtained directly from (5) if one looks for a solution is a form















0 + (1 ¡ ®)(Áuu
0 + Á»)): (22)
The speed c can be determined from (22) subject to (16). Since neither right




If one hypothesizes that the globalization increases the degree of openness,
it would imply that the globalization will increase the speed of the univer-
salization of the behavior across the di¤erent locations.
So far, I assumed that the system moves from one steady state to another
and computed the speed of the switching wave. Next, I will ask what is
the minimal disturbance that will bring a system from one steady state to




f(u)du > 0: (24)
Assume also that at t = ¡1 the system is at the state u = 0. Then at time
19t = 0 a disturbance centered near location x = 0 is created, that is
u(x;0) = u0; 0 < u0 · 1. (25)
@u
@x
(x;0) = 0 (26)
lim
jxj!1
u(x) = 0: (27)
One can interpret (25)-(27) as an invasion of mutants that settle near x = 0.
Note that I allow for u to decrease arbitrary fast, that is an invasion can
be local. The question is, what is the minimal value of u0 that will cause
switching to the state u = 1. The minimal disturbance u corresponds to
the stationary unstable solution of (5). Under our assumptions on the payo¤
function it reduces to
Du
00 + f(u) = 0 (28)




f(u)du = 0: (29)
20Taking into account (24) one obtains u0 < 1. If the integral in (24) is large
enough, that is the value of V (¢) at the global maximum is much bigger than
at the local one, u0 becomes very small and c becomes very big. This implies
that in this case a small mutation is su¢cient to bring the system from a
metastable to the stable set and it travels fast. Vice versa, if V (¢) achieves
approximately the same value at both local maxima, then a large mutation
is needed to take the population from a local to the global maximum and it
travels slow.
We have seen that the very long-run outcome is generically unique (with
exception of special cases when V (¢) has several global maxima). However,
the long-run outcome is history dependent. An interesting observation is
that it is determined only by the spacial average of the initial state. Again,
I will give a proof only for a special case when Á(¢) has form (11) with ¯ = 1




























2u3m§3 ¡ u¤u3m§3 + u
3
3m§1 (35)
for any m 2 Z. Equation (32) implies that u0(t) will converge generically to
one of the local maxima of V (u0). Moreover, the local maximum to which
u0(t) will eventually converge depends only on u0(0). Equation (33) implies
that u3m§1 converges to zero, but then equations (33) and (34) imply that
u3m§2 and u3m§3 converge to zero as well. Hence, any initial distribution of
the traits converges to a spatially uniform stationary outcome. Since, accord-
ing to (31), u0(t) is the spacial average of u(x;t) at time t, the very long-run
22outcome is determined by the spacial average of the initial distribution only.
Note that the long-run outcome is spatially uniform, provided payo¤s do
not depend on x. This implies that for customs and conventions to di¤er
across the locations (for example, for national cultures to exist) in the long-
run one has to postulate that payo¤s for a particular trait di¤er across the
locations. For example, the traits that facilitate cooperation (e. g. reci-
procity) may have more value in a severe climate.
Now let us brie‡y consider the case m = 2. Introduce the polar coordi-
nates (r;Á) on the plane by:
x1 = rcosÁ
x2 = rsinÁ;
where r is the distance from point xto the center of the switching wave and
Á is the polar angle. Symmetry suggests that u = u(r). Let c(R) be the
velocity of the circular switching wave with radius R. Then, repeating the





0 = f(u) + Du
00:
23If the boundary that separates areas with di¤erent conventions is thin, then
c(R) is approximately given by




where c is the velocity of the switching wave in the one-dimensional system






the velocity becomes negative. It means that a mutation that occurred within
an area contained in the circle of radius D=c will not survive. In particu-
lar, a local mutation will not survive. Hence, to cause the switching from a
metastable to the stable state, the mutants should not only be su¢ciently
large in numbers at the particular location, but should also occupy a su¢-
ciently spread area. This phenomenon does not occur in the one-dimensional
systems, however it occurs in all dimensions starting from two. It will imply
that a custom of even a very populated city will not spread, while a custom
of a less populated country or state may.
243 SOME EXAMPLES
In this section I am going to give some examples of the application of the
general model developed in Section 2.




where a < 1 and b > 0. The game has two pure strategy equilibria (A;A)
and (B;B) and a mixed-strategy equilibrium in which strategy A is played
with probability b=(b + 1 ¡ a). For a + b < 1 the equilibrium (A;A) is both
risk and Pareto dominant, while for a + b > 1 the equilibrium (B;B) is risk
dominant, while (A;A) is Pareto dominant.
Let u(x;t) be the fraction of the individuals that play strategy A at




= u(1 ¡ u)((1 ¡ a + b)u ¡ b). (38)
It has three steady states u = 1, u = 0, and u = b=(b + 1 ¡ a). In the
25…rst two all the population is coordinating on a pure strategy equilibrium.
These steady states are asymptotically stable. The third one corresponds to a
heteromorphic population with the share of the population playing strategy
A equal to its equilibrium probability, and is unstable. Since both pure
strategy equilibria are asymptotically stable the predictions of the replicator
dynamics are history dependent. Kandori, Mailath, Rob (1993), and Young
(1993) introduced mutations and showed that as the mutation rate goes to
zero the risk-dominant equilibrium is selected.
With an exception of a one-time mutants invasion, I will not allow for any
mutations taking place on the dynamic path. I will, however, allow for the
migration. Assuming that the migration is totally random, I will show that
in the very long-run the risk-dominant equilibrium is selected and calculate
the speed of the switching wave.
Assuming m = 1 equation (5) takes the form
@u
@t
= u(1 ¡ u)((1 ¡ a + b)u ¡ b) + D
@2u
@x2 (39)
D = °(® + (1 ¡ ®)(1 ¡ a + b)): (40)
Assume the system switches from u = 0 to u = 1. Then from (19) the speed






(1 ¡ a + b)
(1 ¡ (a + b)); (41)
Note that c > 0 if a + b < 1, thus the system in this case indeed switches to
(A;A), while if a + b > 1 it switches to (B;B). Hence, in the very long-run
it switches to the risk-dominant equilibrium. Note, that c is proportional to
1¡(a + b), that is stronger one equilibrium dominates the other in terms of
risk, faster the switch.
Example 2 This example is slightly modi…ed from Basov (2001). Consider
a world that consists of a continuum of workers and a …nite number of …rms.
The …rms are assumed to be pro…t maximizers. The workers can be of two
types: self-interested or reciprocal. The type is …xed for the life, which
consists of two periods.
The …rms do not observe the type of each worker, but know the distri-
bution of types in the population. They can o¤er two types of contracts:
incentive contracts and trust contracts. Given an incentive contract, both
types of workers react identically by choosing the optimal e¤ort, which gen-
erates zero expected pro…ts for the …rms and zero expected utility for the
27workers. Given a trust contract, a self-interested worker shirks, generating
expected monetary payo¤ U2 to herself and expected pro…ts B to the …rm;
and a trustworthy worker exerts an e¤ort, generating expected monetary
payo¤ U1 to herself and expected pro…ts A to the …rm. One can rationalize
this behavior assuming that the utility of a worker equals her current mone-
tary payo¤, plus the utility from the reciprocation if and only if the worker is
reciprocal, and assuming that the time discount factor is zero. If the utility
from the reciprocation for the reciprocal workers is large enough the strate-
gies described above are optimal. Assume that A > 0 > B and U2 > U1 > 0.
After the end of the …rst period the worker may be …red. The probability
of being …red is pF
1 if the worker did not shirk, and pF
2 if she did. Assume
1 >pF
2 >pF
1 > 0, and that all …rms observe whether the worker was …red in
the …rst period before o¤ering the second period contract. Finally, de…ne
¢U = (2 ¡ p
F
1 )U1 ¡ (2 ¡ p
F
2 )U2;
and assume that 0 < ¢U < pF
2 U2 ¡ pF
1 U1.
Let u(x;t) be the share of the reciprocal workers at location x and time
t. Assume and that their …tness payo¤ equals the undiscounted sum of their
28monetary payo¤s. Then the evolution of the share of the reciprocal workers
at a particular location is governed by:
@u
@t




> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
0, if u 2 [0;u] [ fu¤g;
¢U, if u < u < u¤;
2(U1 ¡ U2), if u¤ < u · 1;




Note that while the replicator dynamics has a continuum of steady states,
the only strict maximum of V (u) and hence, the unique asymptotically stable
state is u¤. The result holds irrespectively of m and ®.
Basov (2001) obtained a similar result considering noisy replicator dy-
namics a la Foster and Young (1990). See also Basov (2001) for a discussion
of the properties of this solution. However, the behavioral assumptions nec-
essary to get the noisy replicator dynamics are not trivial. For a discussion,
29see Corradi and Sarin (2000). In my view, the equilibrium selection argument
based on the migration is more persuasive.
The speed of switching wave in this case cannot be calculated analytically,
but for small U1 ¡ U2 it will be proportional to V (u¤) ¡ V (u).
4 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
In this paper I developed a model of the replicator dynamics with migra-
tion. The model can be used to study the equilibrium selection in games.
For 2 £ 2 coordination games the selection criterion coincides with the one
obtained in Foster and Young (1990), KMR (1993), and Young (1993). The
model also allows us to raise some new questions. For example, it allows
us to calculate the speed of the propagation of a new behavior. That is, it
allows to ask, how long will it take for some custom conceived at California
to reach Boston. Note, that this question is di¤erent from how long will it
take for all the population to adopt a new custom. The last question received
a considerable attention in the literature (see, for example, Young 1999 and
Ellison 2000), while this one is, to my knowledge, new.
I was also able to demonstrate that in two-dimensional world, for a new
30convention to spread it is not only necessary, that su¢cient number of peo-
ple adopt it (it has a big size), but they should also be su¢ciently spread.
For example, if a ten-million city, say New York, adopts a new driving con-
vention, it is unlikely that such a convention would survive. However, if a
ten-million country or state adopts one it may survive for a while. Should
the future practice show that it is intrinsically better (for example, causes
fewer accidents) it can spread world-while. The distinction between the size
and the spread is impossible to draw in a network model. It makes perfect
sense, however, within the model of this paper.
Why the spread matters for if there is more than one spacial dimension,
but does not in a one-dimensional world? The driving convention example
suggests a simple intuition. If a city adopts a new driving convention in a two-
dimensional world everybody else travelling between two di¤erent locations
can simply avoid driving through the city. As long as the city is not too
spread this will not be too costly. This is, however, impossible in the one-
dimensional world.
Another interesting conclusion is that local di¤erences in behavior (na-
tional cultures) cannot be explained simple by postulated that the social
interaction is adequately captured by a game with multiple equilibria. For
31customs and conventions to di¤er across the locations (for example, for na-
tional cultures to exist) in the long-run one has to postulate that payo¤s for
a particular trait di¤er across the locations. This justi…es the interest of the
historians to the physical conditions that dominated a nation’s history.
One might wonder, how the results of this paper generalize, if there are
more than two traits. In this case an equation similar to (5) still holds, but
it might be impossible to construct the functional (6). The main di¢culty
is that f(u;x) in general need not be a gradient of some function. If it
is, all the results of Section 2 go through, otherwise the analysis becomes
more complicated. One can still write the analog of equation (17), use it to
…nd the velocity of the switching wave c, and make an equilibrium selection
argument based on the direction of c. However, the selected equilibrium will
no more be the global maximum of some function, and c can be found only
numerically. However, some important conclusions do generalize to this case.
The speed of the spread of the conventions is still determined endogenously
and is proportional to the square root of openness, and for a convention to
survive in at least two spatial dimensions it should have a minimum spread.
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35APPENDIX 1
In this Appendix I present a slightly modi…ed version of the Aspiration
and Imitation model (Samuelson 1997, Ch. 3). The only deviation from the
original model is that I assume that the population is hyper…nite rather then
…nite. I show that in this the share of the population following a particular
strategy is governed by the replicator dynamics. The result is exact in con-
trast with the …nite population case where it is obtained only in the limit.
For a de…nition of the hyper…nite numbers and the other notions of the non-
standard analysis see, for example, Albeverio, Fenstad, Høegh-Krohn, and
Lindstrøm (1986) and Appendix 2 to this paper.
The nonstandard analysis allows for the existence of positive in…nitely
small and …nite in…nitely large numbers. Intuitively, a hyper…nite number is
an in…nite natural number. The value of using the nonstandard techniques
is that they allows us to have an exact law of large numbers without running
into the measurability problems (Keisler, 1987).
Consider the following symmetric 2 £ 2 game
36X Y
X A; A C; B
Y B; C D; D
:
Let there be a single population containing N players, where N is hyper…-
nite.3 Time is divided into discrete intervals of an in…nitesimal length ¿ > 0.
In each period a player is characterized by a pure strategy X or Y she is
currently playing. If a player with strategy S1 (S1¡ strategist) is matched
against the player with a strategy S2 (S2¡ strategist) then the realized payo¤
is the sum of the payo¤ shown in the matrix above and a realization R of
a random variable e R with zero mean. This random variable captures the
factors outside the model that might a¤ect the players’ payo¤s.
If a player plays strategy X in a population where proportion k of her
opponents play X, then her expected payo¤ is given by
¼X(k) = kA + (1 ¡ k)C:
3Since the external cardinality of any hyper…nite set is continuum (Albeverio, Fenstad,
Høegh-Krohn, and Lindstrøm 1986) we are actually speaking about a population with a
continuum of individuals.
37The expected payo¤ to a Y ¡strategist in the same population is
¼Y (k) = kB + (1 ¡ k)D:
In each period of length ¿, each player takes a draw from an independently
distributed Bernoulli random variable. Assume that a draw “learn” is pro-
duced with probability ¿. If the player receives a learn draw, she abandons
her current strategy if and only if her realized payo¤ is below her aspiration
level, ¢. If player i has abandoned her strategy, she must now choose a new
strategy. For this purpose she randomly selects a member j of the population
and imitates player’s j strategy. This rule determines a Markov process.
Let z(t) denote the proportion of X¡strategists in the population at time
t. To proceed further I need the following de…nition





z(t + ¿) ¡ z(t)
¿
); (A.1)
where ¿ 6= 0 is in…nitely small.
38Here St(¢) is the standard part operator. For each hyperreal number its
standard part is the unique standard (usual) real number such that it di¤ers
from the hyperreal in question by an in…nitely small quantity. One can show
that if z(t) is di¤erentiable in the usual sense the right hand side of (A.1)
does not depend on ¿ and the derivative de…ned in this way coincides with
the classical derivative.
To derive the equation governing the evolution of z(t) …rst note that the
probability a player abandons her strategy is given by
g(¼) = F(¢ ¡ ¼); (A.2)
where ¼ is the expected payo¤ her strategy gives and F(¢) is the c.d.f. of
random variable e R. I will assume that e R is determined uniformly on [¡!;
!], where for some large …nite ! . Let º = 1=N. Then at each moment of
time z(t) 2 f0; º; 2º; :::; 1g. The state of the population is characterized by
the value of z(t). The change in the share of X¡strategists during a single
period can be written as number of Y ¡strategists becoming X¡strategists,
Fin, minus the number of X¡ strategists becoming one strategists, Fout. A
Y ¡strategist becoming an X¡strategist if three thinks happen: she receives
39a learn draw, she has to decide to abandon her current strategy, and she
should select an X¡strategist from the population. Taking into account
that the law of large numbers holds exactly in the hyper…nite setting (Keisler,
1987) the in‡ow of X¡strategists can be written as:
Fin = z(1 ¡ z)N¿g(¼X(z)):
Following a similar logic
Fout = z(1 ¡ z)N¿g(¼Y (z)):
Hence,
N(z(t + ¿) ¡ z(t)) = z(1 ¡ z)N¿(g(¼X(z) ¡ g(¼Y (z)):






(¼X(z) ¡ ¼Y (z)):
Rescaling time to eliminate the 2! we obtain the replicator dynamics.
40APPENDIX 2
It is not the aim of this Appendix to develop a complete theory of hyper-
real numbers. An interested reader can address herself to Albeverio, Fenstad,
Høegh-Krohn, and Lindstrøm (1986). Here I want just to persuade the reader
that the hyperreal numbers are no more mysterious than the reals and hence,
all the calculations based on the nonstandard analysis are perfectly sound.
One of the ways to construct the reals R from the rationals Q is to add to
Q newpoints to represent limits of the fundamental sequences of real numbers
(see, for example, Vulikh 1963). To get the hyperreals from the reals one has
to follow the same procedure but be more accurate in identifying sequences.
Intuitively, we care not only about the limit, but also about the rate of
convergence and the asymptotic properties.
We would certainly like to identify two sequences that agree everywhere
but on a …nite set of indexes. Such sequences clearly have the same asymp-
totic properties and it will be desirable to have them in the same equivalence
class. Call the corresponding equivalence relation %. It would be a natural
attempt to identify hyperreals with the equivalences classes of %. However, if
we identify a hyperreal number with the set of equivalence classes of relation
% then the set of hyperreals will contain the divisors of zero. Consider, for
41example, two sequences fxng1
n=0 and fyng1
n=0. Assume that xn = 1 if n is
even and xn = 0 if n is odd. The reverse is true for fyng1
n=0. Neither of
these sequences is in the same equivalence class as fzng1
n=0, where zn = 0 for
any n. However, xnyn = 0. To avoid this problem we have to rede…ne the
equivalence relation in such a way that either fxng1
n=0 or fyng1
n=0 becomes
equivalent to zero. That is, not only the sequences that di¤er on the …nite
set of indexes are equivalent, but so are some sequences that di¤er on an
in…nite set of indexes.
Formally, let N be the set of natural numbers.
De…nition 2 F ½ 2N is called a …lter if
1. N 2 F, ; 2 F.
2. A1 2 F, A2 2 F implies A1 \ A2 2 F.
3. A 2 F, A ½ B implies B 2 F.
It is easy to check that if F is the family of all subsets of N with a …nite
complement then F is a …lter. Call this …lter F0.
Call two sequences fung1
n=0 and fvng1
n=0 equivalent with respect to F or
F¡equivalent if
fn 2 N : un = vng 2 F:
42It is easy to see that neither fxng1
n=0 nor fyng1
n=0 is not F0¡equivalent to
fzng1
n=0 . The problem hence, is to …nd an extension Fu of …lter F0 in such a
way that at least one of these sequences is equivalent to fzng1
n=0 with respect
to Fu.
De…nition 3 A …lter Fu is called a free ultra…lter if
1. Fu contains no …nite sets.
2. For any E ½ N either E 2 Fu or N=E 2 Fu.
It can be shown (see, Albeverio, Fenstad, Høegh-Krohn, and Lindstrøm
1986) that there exists a free ultra…lter Fu such that F0 ½ Fu. Clearly, either
fxng1
n=0 or fyng1
n=0 should be equivalent to zero with respect to such an
ultra…lter, since according to the second part of de…nition it should contain
either odd or even numbers.
The ultra…lter extending F0 is not unique. Fix such an ultra…lter and
call two sequences of reals equivalent if they are Fu¡ equivalent. The set of
equivalence classes are called hyperreals. One can de…ne all usual arithmetic
operations and the order relation on this set. The process is similar to the
extension of the arithmetic operations and the order relation from the ra-
tionals to the reals using the construction discussed in the beginning of this
Appendix.
43It is easy to see that this construction allows for the existence of the
positive in…nitely small reals4. Consider, for example, the equivalence class






Call the corresponding hyperreal ". Then " 6= 0. Indeed, for " to be equal
to zero it is necessary for set Z = fn 2 N : un = 0g to be in…nite, since Fu
is free. But Z = ;. One can check, however, that k" < 1 for any k 2 N.
Naturally, 1=" > k for any k 2 N, namely 1=" is in…nitely large.
4A positive number ± is called in…nitely small if m± < 1 for any m 2 N.
44